

00920

1988/03/18

RELEASER IN PART

2057

B1, A3, A5

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

042*

EAP/CM:RLWILLIAMS
03/18/88 EXT. 6300
EAP:GSIGUR

NEA-RMURPHY /S/Craig
S/S:

P:DKENNEY

IMMEDIATE BEIJING, RIYADH IMMEDIATE, TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE,
CAIRO IMMEDIATE

DECAPTIONED
NODIS

CAIRO-EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

DECL:OADR

PREL, PARM, MASS, MNUC, CH, SA, IS, EG

GS

ARMACOST-QIAN TALK ON SAUDI MISSILES

RLW

RM

DK

S/S

1. SUMMARY: ON INSTRUCTION MARCH 17 PRC CHARGE QIAN
TOLD UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST THAT [REDACTED]

2. ARMACOST ASKED FOR DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE
MISSILE AND FOR A SINO-AMERICAN DIALOGUE ON CONTROLLING
THE GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, AND IN
PARTICULAR THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME. [REDACTED]

B1,A5,A3

[REDACTED] ARMACOST SAID THAT THE US CONCERN WAS RATHER
OVER THE VOLATILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE POTENTIAL
THAT OTHER-SOURCE NUCLEAR OR CHEMICAL WARHEADS MIGHT COME

B1,A3,A5

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SECRET

2

TO BE FITTED TO THE CHINESE DELIVERY VEHICLES. END
SUMMARY.

3. RECALLING THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD RAISED THE SAUDI
MISSILE MATTER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WU AT DINNER
MARCH 26, CHARGE QIAN YONGNIAN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAD
INSTRUCTED HIM TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL
RESPONSE {NOT QUITE VERBATIM}:

B1,A3,A5

4. ARMACOST RESPONDED THAT THE US TOO REGARDS SAUDI
ARABIA AS A SOURCE OF STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND
WELCOMES THE EVOLUTION OF SINO-SAUDI RELATIONS AS AN
ADDITIONAL SUCH SOURCE. FROM BOTH STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC
VIEWPOINTS WE REGARD THE SAUDIS AS IMPORTANT. IT WOULD
BE HELPFUL TO US IF CHINA COULD PROVIDE SOME MORE
SPECIFIC INFORMATION {QIAN INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD NO
TECHNICAL INFORMATION AT HAND}:

-- WHAT SYSTEM WAS SOLD?

-- WHAT IS ITS RANGE?

-- WHAT IS THE WARHEAD -- THE WEIGHT OF THE HIGH
EXPLOSIVE AND THE WEIGHT OF THE OVERALL PAYLOAD INCLUDING
THE REENTRY VEHICLE?

-- WHAT IS ITS ACCURACY, IN TERMS OF METERS OR CIRCULAR
ERROR OF PROBABILITY?

SECRET

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SECRET

3

-- HAS THE SYSTEM EVER BEEN DESIGNED OR TESTED WITH A CHEMICAL WARHEAD? HOW EASILY CAN THE CONVENTIONAL WARHEAD BE REPLACED BY A NUCLEAR WARHEAD?

-- HOW MANY MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS HAVE BEEN SOLD?

5. ARMACOST REGRETTED THAT THE STORY WAS APPARENTLY ABOUT TO BREAK IN THE PRESS. HE NOTED THAT US CONCERNS OVER THE INSTALLATIONS WERE DUAL: THEY WERE LOCATED IN THE VOLATILE AREA BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PERSIAN GULF, WHERE THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT WAS EVER-PRESENT; AND THE TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED WAS HIGHLY WORRISOME. AS THE CHINESE KNEW, THE US AND USSR HAD JUST SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ELIMINATING SUCH SYSTEMS. [REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

6. YES, ARMACOST RESPONDED, BUT MISSILE SYSTEMS POSE GREAT RISKS [REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

7. [REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

8. QIAN SAID [REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

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SECRET

4

[REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

9.

[REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

10.

[REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

11. ARMACOST ASKED IF THERE WERE ADDITIONAL POINTS FROM
THE US SIDE, AND EAP ACTING DAS WILLIAMS STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING DIALOGUE ON THE GLOBAL PROBLEM
OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY.

[REDACTED]

B1,A3,A5

12. ALSO PARTICIPATING WERE SPECIAL ASSISTANT KENNEY OF
P AND INTERPRETERS VIVIAN CHANG AND CHEN MINGMING.

44

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